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Implicit Questions in Michael
Confino’s Essay
Corporate state and vertical relationships
Questions implicites dans l’essai de Michael Confino : État corporatif et
verticalité des relations
David L. Ransel
1 We owe a debt to Michael Confino for his willingness to raise thorny intellectual issues.
While members of our craft often set problems of framing aside and simply place our
stories on the stage we are given, Confino asked us to think about how the stage was
constructed.  He  wanted  us  to  examine  our  presuppositions  and  to  guard  against
uncritical acceptance of established conceptual categories and perspectives. Now again in
his essay “The Soslovie (Estate) Paradigm,” he vigorously interrogated the meaning of this
widely accepted term for defining social groups in Imperial Russia. What remained after
Confino’s analysis was not pretty. In his judgment, soslovie had no meaning in regard to
peasants and served merely to disguise the truly meaningful pre-existing institutions of
peasant life. The soslovie concept likewise turned out not to be helpful in understanding
most other groups in Russian society. It was either too freely employed as an identifier
for city dwellers,  yielding at  least  four urban commercial  estates,  plus all  manner of
professions – the learned estate, medical estate, administrative estate – or it was not
applied at all to one of the fastest growing social groups, the “people of various ranks.” In
the one case where it might have made sense, the Russian nobility, which, along with the
clergy, was the closest thing Russia had to an ascriptive group, Confino questioned the
usefulness of a category that covered people of vastly differing degrees of wealth, dignity,
and status. Indeed, borrowing from the work of Roland Mousnier and of François Bluche
and Jean-François Solnon, Confino even dismissed the utility of the concept of estate for
analyzing French and other  European societies.  If  the  notion of  estates  in  European
history lacked explanatory value because it lumped together many disparate groups and
obscured their influence on events,  how would the importation of such an imprecise
classification help to explain the development of the rather different Russian society?
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2 At the end Confino threw up his hands and wondered if we might not simply have to
accept  soslovie because  of  its  established  position  in  the  literature.  Here  he  seemed
especially  influenced  by  Vasilii  Kliuchevskii’s  use  of  the  term to  stand  for  a  “social
category.” Because Kliuchevskii was known to be precise in his language, Confino argued,
his  usage  must  have  been  common  at  the  time  he  was  writing.  Confino  therefore
concluded  that  we  might  as  well  retain  the  term  soslovie as  a  convenience,  while
understanding its limitations – at least until a better solution comes along.
3 Confino’s  thoughtful  essay  raises  a  number  of  questions  explicitly  but  even  more
interestingly implicitly. I would like to focus on the implicit questions.
4 The  first  of  these  was  to  ask  “whither  Russia?”  Was  Russia  developing  somewhat
belatedly into a society of  estates on the presumed European model and then into a
society of classes,  again on the presumed European model,  as most scholars cited by
Confino asserted? Or was Russia’s development,  though following these general lines,
compromised by a failure of Russian social estates and classes to replicate faithfully the
European examples and therefore to lack internal cohesion and a consequent ability to
resist obliteration by the state? Confino explicitly affirmed the existence of society in
Russia  and  rejected  the  idea  that  social  groups  were  “alienated  from  each  other,
fragmented,  and  isolated,”  and  he  dismissed  as  hollow the  shibboleth  of  a  “divorce
between state and society.”2
5 Although it is hard to disagree with any of these positions, Confino seemed nevertheless
to be sufficiently captive of the estates to class paradigm that he did not consider another
model of  Russia’s development that may have more explanatory power,  namely,  that
Russia was developing into a corporate state. Was this not where Russia ended up in the
Soviet period when huge ministries,  industries,  educational facilities,  “voluntary” and
other organizations were aligned with state objectives by party managers, and when a
large  part  of  the  population’s  wages,  housing,  personal  identity,  job  or  educational
opportunities, and scarce household and food items were acquired through one’s place of
employment? Now again, after a decade or so of no consciously articulated social and
economic system,3 Russia seems headed back to a corporatist state structure. At least this
is how some of both the critics and supporters of the Putin regime are describing its
arrangements. Andrei Illarionov, a former economic adviser to Putin who turned critic of
the regime, announced at the end of 2005 that the “process of this state evolving into a
new corporativist (sic) model reached its completion in 2005. Quantitative changes have
evolved into qualitative ones.” Illarionov went on to say that the “strengthening of the
corporativist state model and setting up favorable conditions for quasi-state monopolies
by the state  itself  hurt  the  economy.  […]  Cabinet  members  or  key Presidential  Staff
executives chairing corporation boards or serving on those boards are the order of the
day in Russia. In what Western country – except in the corporativist state that lasted for
20 years in Italy – is such a phenomenon possible? Which, actually, proves that the term
corporativist properly applies to Russia today.” 4 An importantly placed defender of the
regime  likewise  defined  Russia  as  a  developing  corporate  state,  and,  in  contrast  to
Illarionov, assessed this trend in a positive light.  In an article in the leading Russian
business  newspaper,  Kommersant,  Viktor  Cherkesov,  head  of  the  Russian  Drug
Enforcement Administration, claimed that the only development scenario for Russia that
is both realistic and relatively favorable is continued evolution into a corporatist state
ruled by security service officials.5
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6 This outcome should not be surprising. Movement to corporatism began in the imperial
period, most visibly in the military and in large government ministries and other offices
that bestowed on their members not just wages and pensions, purpose and respect, but
even in many cases a social identity reinforced and made visible by way of a uniform
decorated in colors and patterns specific to the person’s group. These corporate units
exhibited cleavages in terms of wealth and responsibility, proximity to and distance from
the ruler, and others. But they operated on the basis of common goals and allegiance to
the  leadership  and  in  this  sense  grew  out  of  or  merged  with  older  forms  of  loyal
association, namely, personal clienteles of the kind that furnished the building blocks of
Russian politics  in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.6 In time other types of
organizations became “incorporated” and subject to a form of state tutelage that is a
characteristic feature of corporatism (see below). One of the reasons the soslovie and class
models cause difficulty for scholars “even as a working hypothesis,” as Confino wrote,
may be their failure to capture this more fundamental movement toward a corporatist
state and society.
7 Analysts may have avoided describing Russia’s development in these terms because of the
unfortunate associations that corporatism carries with fascism and Nazism, as the remark
cited above by Andrei Illarionov suggests.7 But corporatism and fascism are by no means
synonymous. As for Russia, Hans Rogger some time ago explained that fascism did not
and could not have appeared in tsarist Russia, despite the efforts of some scholars to find
it there.8 Even Stalinism, which exhibited some features of fascism such as the leader cult,
did not include other characteristic elements such as glorification of a nation of blood,
nostalgia  for  historical  social  arrangements,  and explicit  racism.  Russia  could not  be
usefully labeled fascist at any time in the past, and attempts by a few scholars to brand it
so today are, as Andreas Umland has recently argued, unwise and possibly dangerous.9
8 I use the term corporatism in two ways. The first refers to the incorporation of
individuals into functionally differentiated bodies like the tsarist ministries, referred to
earlier,  and also business  enterprises,  labor unions,  and other organizations that  act
collectively  while  imparting  to  their  members  a  sense  of  purpose  and  identity.  The
second refers to social and governmental arrangements designed to mediate between
these  other  bodies  and  to  balance  their  interests  for  the  common  good.  These
arrangements have formed in democratic as well as in authoritarian systems and have
been inflected by leftist as well as rightist ideologies. Democratic versions have appeared
in Sweden and a number of other European states; leftist versions, even if we exclude self-
declared  “socialist”  states,  have  appeared  in  Peru  and  some  other  Latin  American
countries. Although Philippe Schmitter and other theorists of corporatism have sketched
typologies that include a number of variants, the concept refers in essence to a system of
authority and interest representation that is designed to integrate labor and capital into a
web of hierarchically ordered and functionally defined units that are guided or directed
by the state to produce socially peaceful outcomes.10
9 The historical foundations of modern corporatism go back to the patrimonial regimes of
early modern times,  in which public  and private domains easily  interpenetrated one
another and elites and the state administration cooperated in absorbing and directing
rising social  forces.11 In Russia,  this type of regime emerged as early as the fifteenth
century.  According to Richard Pipes,  the most prominent western student of  Russian
conservatism, patrimonialism or the notion that Russian rulers are private owners of
their domains and everything that resides in them, derived from the reality of power in
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the  period  of  Mongol  conquest  when public  authority  rested  with  the  Mongols  and
Russian princes were understood to be merely private owners of appanages. As Mongol
control receded, the Moscow princes (as well as other less wealthy princes) elided their
newly-acquired public power with their private ownership. All land, goods, and persons
in their domain belonged to them as patrimonial rulers. The Russian Orthodox Church
reinforced this power by allying itself with the ruler and conferring on him the title of
Caesar (tsar), a designation previously reserved for the Mongol khan. Given this merger
of personal ownership and state sovereignty, when independent enterprises developed
profitably, the ruler freely appropriated them as regalia.12 By the same logic, when other
organized bodies emerged, they were absorbed and directed by the state. Indeed, the
state  itself  created  corporate  units  with  the  aim  of  fostering  military  or  economic
strength,  for  example  the  dvorianstvo and  magistraty.  Although  these  two  state-
constructed  units  coincided  with  soslovie groups,  they  did  not,  as  Confino  rightly
concluded, function as social estates and were always subject to state tutelage. Take, for
example, the dvorianstvo.  After creating this service group in early modern times, the
state set the conditions of entry by enacting the Table of Ranks, formed noble societies
for  the  estate  in  the  reforms  of  Catherine  II,  and  thereafter  increasingly  regulated
relations of the landed nobility and its labor force (the enserfed peasantry). Finally, in the
reforms of Nicholas I the state again redefined membership in the nobility and in the
following reign divested it of its labor force by emancipating the serfs.
10 From  this  point  on  the  tsarist  government,  acting  in  fits  and  starts  and  without  a
consciously  conceived  long-range  plan,  was  converting  the  patrimonial  state  into  a
modern corporate state system. As modern corporations, organizations of industrialists,
labor  unions,  and  professional  and  voluntary  organizations  supplanted  older  social
formations, the state bureaucracy sought to manage and direct them toward economic
development under conditions of social harmony.13
11 Indeed, the state bureaucracy was itself a primary example of corporate organization. I
have already mentioned the corporate character of the ministries in their provision of
purpose, identity, and security. It is enough to add that by the twentieth century each
specialist  ministry  had,  as  a  leading  historian  of  the  bureaucracy  writes,  “its  own
microcosmic world of educational institutions, offices, and other career support systems
in the provinces.”14 In short, the ministries provided a life course for ambitious and loyal
recruits  and  their  families.  Corporatism can  be  seen,  too,  in  the  close  tutelage  and
protection given to industry and banks, which were regularly subsidized and bailed out
by the government. The Society for Assistance to Russian Industry and Trade worked
hand in hand with the government to develop policies of protectionism.15 Syndicates and
cartels were permitted and in some cases even encouraged by the government.16 The
Department (later Ministry) of Trade and Industry brought into its advisory structures
the leading representatives of industry. In 1906 a permanent Council of Representatives
of Industry and Trade was formed to act as a corporate lobby for a wide range of business
enterprises.
12 While a central objective of the corporate state was the promotion and protection of
commerce and industry, it also sought to manage relations between business and labor.
Here, too, the aspiration of the Russian government was clear, even if its plans ultimately
fell  short of intentions.  Efforts in this direction began as early as the 1850s with the
convening of state committees on the labor question, and intervention began in earnest
in the early 1880s when the government enacted a series of laws for the protection of
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women and children workers. At the same time it established a factory inspectorate to
monitor compliance.17 A far-reaching labor code followed in 1866, much to the dismay of
factory  owners  and  industrialists.  Although  the  conscientious  efforts  by  factory
inspectors to enforce the law prompted a backlash from the employer associations that
led to the dismissal  of  the finance minister who had sponsored the reforms (Nikolai
Bunge),  the  inspectorate  remained,  along  with  provincial  factory  boards,  for  the
regulation of relations between labor and management. It is worth mentioning that a
pioneering historian of the factory inspectorate, Frederick Giffin, pointed out in Bunge’s
defense that he had “not violated the traditional practices of the government […] On the
contrary, his efforts to regulate the relations of management and labour merely reflected
the unique extent to which in Russia the state customarily intervened in the social and
economic affairs of the people.”18 After the turn of the century, new measures were added
that required employers to provide health insurance and pensions for sick and disabled
workers. For their part, the business leaders were organizing to defend their interests,
most  actively  in  the  stock  exchange  societies  and  in  the  yearly  congresses  of
representatives  of  industry  and  trade  that  were  held  after  1906.19 These  groups
coordinated  their  responses  to  government  policy  and  even  generated  their  own
proposals for government action. Members of the exchange committees served on a large
number of government councils in specialist and advisory roles, being thus incorporated
into to the process of central state decision making. Indeed, a principal complaint of the
business representatives was that their vote was merely advisory and that the officials
made  the  final  decisions.20 The  business  representatives  wanted  then  what  Andrei
Illarionov contends business leaders have now finally achieved in post-socialist Russia.
13 The requirements imposed on employers in tsarist times were complemented by attempts
to capture and direct the labor movement from the inside. An extreme case came in the
form of the police socialism inspired by the chief of the Moscow okhrana Sergei Zubatov, a
tactic that,  unfortunately,  led to the catastrophe of Bloody Sunday. But,  whatever its
missteps, the government was gradually moving the earlier patrimonial regime toward
what we now can recognize as  a  type of  corporatist  state in which the tsar and his
ministers sought to guide development by incorporating organized interest groups into
government  councils,  subsidizing  many  of  them  and  mediating  between  them.  This
course, established by the 1880s, continued right up to the revolution of 1917.21
14 Although I have emphasized the role of the state, it is worth adding here that the process
of  incorporation  was  not  unidirectional.  The  state  did  not  simply  create  and  direct
organized groups. Corporate groups themselves attempted to colonize the state. Modern
organizations,  just  as  in the case of  clientele  and patronage groups in earlier  times,
sought  to  capture  agencies  of  the  state  and  use  them for  their  own  purposes.  The
effectiveness of a particular ruling regime could be measured by its ability to balance and
guide these forces while not capitulating to one or another of them.
15 The developments  of  the late  tsarist  era  came to  fruition in the Soviet  state,  which
incorporated and guided virtually  every  institution.  This  and the  absence  of  private
property represented a quantitative change that theorists have tended to believe makes
socialist states qualitatively different. This is especially so in the case of theorists who
accept  the  label  “totalitarian”  for  socialist  systems.22 If,  however,  we  set  aside  the
aspirational totalitarianism of the Stalin years when Party leaders sometimes yielded to
the urge to destroy rather than guide and tutor groups that might oppose its policies, we
can see that  the Soviet  leadership,  too,  was operating as  the mediator of  competing
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corporate interests, many of which, just as in the late tsarist period, were represented in
the ministerial hierarchies. The result was what Jerry Hough has labeled institutional or
institutionalized pluralism, but it might just as well be referred to as corporatism.23 In
promoting development, the Soviet leaders sought to guide and oblige various legitimate
competing  interests  (unsanctioned  political  action,  certain  cultural  expression,  and
nationality  assertions  were  obviously  excluded  and  suppressed)  with  the  aim  of
modernizing while maintaining social harmony. Soviet Russia behaved much like other
authoritarian corporatist states.
16 By employing the  soslovie to  class  paradigm to  explain  modernization,  we may have
hindered more than helped our efforts. The baggy concepts of estate and class, being
structuralist  in  character,  are  not  conducive  to  change,  whereas  corporations  are
functionalist  in  concept  and  therefore  adaptable.  They  are  formed  and  recognized
through their service to the state. What is more, an analysis of Russia as a patrimonial
state on its way to becoming a corporate state and society allows us to understand the
development  of  tsarist,  socialist,  and  post-socialist  Russia  in  a  single  conceptual
framework.24
17 A  second  implicit  problem  related  to  the  soslovie paradigm  involves  the  everyday
interactions of Russians of various social and cultural levels. Michael Confino was well
aware of  this  question,  as  he  first  raised it  nearly  20  years  ago in  a  working paper
presented at the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies in Washington, D.C.25 In
his analysis, he drew on the geographic and statistical mapping of St. Petersburg by James
Bater and pointed out that Russians of every social level lived side-by-side in the city and
often in the very same building.26 The residential profile, Confino explained, showed
an admixture, of classes rather than segregation, even in the so-called fashionable
areas. […] all groups and classes were living in an extremely mixed social milieu and
economic environment. With regard to housing, to use a metaphor warranted by
the facts, the social classes dispersion of the population was not chiefly a horizontal
or an areal one (as in the big West European and North American cities),  but a
vertical  one:  in  the  central  city  (with  very  few  exceptions),  the  first  floor  was
occupied  mainly  by  workplaces  and  residences  of  small-business  owners;  the
middle floors (second to fourth) were the domain of well-to-do noble, “bourgeois”
and officials’ families; above and below, in the garrets and cellars, and also away –
in the backyards: lower income groups, workers, and household servants (men and
women).27
18 In other words, Russian society was not composed of isolated and alienated units, as the
soslovie paradigm  suggests,  but  of  a  variety  of  socio-economic  groups  that  daily
encountered one another as denizens of the same streets or even residents of the same
property.
19 But how does one get at this reality, given the tsarist government’s decision to administer
Russia as a society of sosloviia? Because Russia was ruled as an assortment of socially
specific groups, records were organized and preserved by institution and social position.
As  a  consequence,  scholars  have found it  difficult  to  integrate and analyze relations
between people of different social statuses. The observable interactions, when they went
beyond  a  single  ministry,  party,  or  social  estate,  were  usually  two-sided.  Historians
examine petitions from subordinates to superiors or look at court cases that pitted a
person of  one social  estate against  a  person of  another.  But  these limited and often
conflictual  documents  tell  less  about  what  held  Russian  society  together  than about
points of stress and possible rupture. Examples of this type of inter-estate conflict can be
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found in Elise Wirtschafter’s recent response to Michael Confino’s essay on soslovie.28 The
barriers  posed by this  structure of  preserved knowledge,  when added to  the society
versus state paradigm so central to the intelligentsia’s sense of identity, left us with a
peculiar bibliographic legacy. We have shelves of books on the nobility, the intelligentsia,
the peasantry, various government ministries, and a growing body of literature on the
clergy and the merchants,  but these studies by and large consider social  groups and
institutions in isolation from the state and the rest  of  Russian society.  The principal
exceptions are, as just noted, instances of conflict with other groups. No wonder that
historians  have  been  inclined  to  focus  on  the  dysfunctional  aspects  of  Russia’s
development. The soslovie paradigm steers them directly toward this dimension and away
from the more functional features.
20 As George Yaney pointed out nearly a half century ago in response to the famous debate
sparked by Leopold Haimson in the Slavic  Review,  the workings of  a  society are best
understood by examining its “going concerns.” The analyses of Haimson and the others in
the debate, however, considered only the points of tension and conflict. As a result, Yaney
contended, the debaters ended up basing their judgments on the slogans, wild hopes, and
delusions  of  would-be  revolutionaries  and  therefore  failed  to  see  clearly  the  social
dynamics of the time. Even the assessments of government officials, to the extent they
used  western  standards  to  measure  Russia’s  progress,  were  misguided.  According  to
Yaney, “If one is to consider the strengths and weaknesses of Russian society prior to
World War I, one must first of all seek out the relationships which formed the ‘going
concerns,’ focusing on what they did, not what they said they were doing.”29 In this rather
awkward sentence,  Yaney meant  to  say  that  Russian managers  often lamented their
inability to achieve their stated and usually western-influenced goals, angrily accusing
colleagues, workers, government officials and others of impeding their progress. It is not
difficult  therefore  to  find  areas  of  friction,  stress,  and  potential  rupture  in  Russia’s
rapidly industrializing society. It is evidently harder to see that the frictions and stresses
were in many cases the result of growing interactions of people who had not previously
worked together to reach mutual goals. But work together they did, and they achieved
remarkable progress. In the industrial and commercial enterprises, professional societies,
the  zemstvos,  the  rapidly  expanding  cooperative  movement,  schools,  the  budding
peasant legal culture, emergent political parties, voluntary associations, charities, and
many other manifestations of collaboration within and across social groups we find the
going concerns that allowed Russia to function as an integrated society. Scholars who
simply read back from the collapse of the autocratic government and sketch a picture of
Russia as a dysfunctional polity miss crucial developments that were transforming the
country into a modern industrial state and eventual superpower. This was, of course, a
central criticism leveled by Michael Confino, who complained that historians were in the
grip of a teleological impulse that obliged them to seek out the roots of the governmental
and societal collapse that they knew had to come.
21 Similarly,  we need to be aware of how established categories of classification conceal
rather than illuminate the relationships that allowed Russians to function effectively as a
society.  It  is  hard  to  disagree  with  Michael  Confino’s  contention  that  the  soslovie
paradigm, to the extent that it designated social estates on the European model rather
than merely social groups, constituted a blinder of this sort. Whatever utility the soslovie
classifications may have offered the tsarist government and Russian subjects for pigeon-
holing individuals and defining the privileges and obligations attaching to them, it has
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obscured our understanding of the relationships that held Russia together as a society.
The unfortunate bibliographic legacy, mentioned earlier,  that the soslovie idea and its
consequent ordering of archives has bequeathed our field is only now being overcome in
a few studies that demonstrate the weaknesses of the paradigm and in others that reveal
some of the vertical relationships that characterized Russian society.30
22 My own research has sought  to investigate the vertical  relationships that  cut  across
soslovie lines and illuminated the bonds, or going concerns, that lay at the heart of the
Russian social system. My earliest research project discussed the clienteles that formed in
support of a patron who occupied a high position in politics and state service. The patron
could provide jobs and protection, while the clients and their minions furnished patrons
with information on competing clienteles, support in shaping public opinion, and the
power to act (through their positions in the government and military).31 My most recent
monograph was conceived as a direct response to Michael Confino’s challenge to explore
interactions between people of different social positions. I found that this could best be
done by getting away from the administratively organized sources and finding windows
into the everyday life of society. A forty-year diary of a provincial merchant in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries opened such a window. The diary revealed a
merchant  family  that  in  no  way  fit  the  intelligentsia’s  hostile  portrayal  of  a  “dark
kingdom,”  self-enclosed,  ignorant,  and  brutal.  The  merchant  and his  family  were  in
almost  daily  contact  with people  at  every level  of society:  his  merchant  and artisan
colleagues, of course, but also central and local government officials,  the clergy from
parish priests to the bishop, serfs who were members of the household, and at least a
dozen noble families, including the illustrious princes Golitsyn and the widow of Ivan
Orlov, one of the famous Orlov brothers who engineered the coup that brought Catherine
II  to the throne.  The merchant in question became well-known locally for his  grand
masonry townhouse, the first in his provincial city, and the home’s magnificent gardens
and orangery. He attended the theater, read books, purchased scientific instruments, and
sent his first son to a private pansion in Moscow that taught foreign languages.32 In short,
we see in central Russia of the eighteenth century the kind of daily mixing of social ranks
that  Confino  pointed  to  in  early  twentieth-century  Petersburg.  And  the  provincial
merchant family of my study who moved so freely across social and cultural boundaries,
while not typical of all merchants, was far from alone. As we know from other diaries and
studies of provincial and Moscow life, well-to-do merchant families were enjoying many
of the same possessions and pleasures as the nobility, if not its legal privileges.33
23 To see this reality it is necessary to radically alter our scale of observation. Historians
who accept the given organizational categories of soslovie and class and base an analysis
on its workings will capture a certain high-angle or macrohistorical view of the society,
comparable  in  some  respects  to  an  aerial  photograph  of  city  or  landscape.  This
perspective may be adequate for general  surveys of  Russian history,  especially if  the
objective is to make Russia comprehensible to readers familiar with the histories of West
European societies.
24 This view from on high will not suffice, however, if one wishes to understand Russian
social dynamics on their own terms. For this, two other perspectives are important. The
first is a clear understanding of the extraordinary variation that resided within soslovie
and class groupings. Because Michael Confino and Elise Wirtschafter have written much
about this, I will not dwell on it here. It is enough to remind readers that the nobility
included people of every socio-economic level, from fabulously wealthy land and factory
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owners to thousands of impoverished persons who lived no better than peasants, were
uneducated,  did not  fulfill  service obligations,  and earned a  living by small  farming,
delivering mail or running a local inn. To give one example, the merchant of my study on
his travels through Tver province, where many such poor “nobles” lived, looked on them
with a mixture of surprise and pity. Within a few days of staying at a village inn run by a
poor noble,  the merchant in question and his wife were in Petersburg attending the
theater and ceremonial events at which the emperor and imperial family appeared. The
uneducated and penurious nobles of Tver province in their gray peasant kaftans would
not likely have felt welcome at such events. Peasants, too, could be found at virtually
every socio-economic level.  Many were seasonal  or  permanent  traders  in the towns,
artisans, factory workers (whether in cities or manufacturing hamlets). Some owned or
managed factories and other commercial enterprises and were on their way to becoming
registered townspeople or merchants. But the behavior of even the large numbers who
remained agriculturalists could not, as Confino pointed out, be understood through social
estate or class analyses.
25 The second perspective is microhistorical. If the macro view resembles a grainy aerial
photograph, the micro perspective requires the filming of a small area at ground level.
Here social interactions are much denser and more complicated than is evident at the
macro level, where “reality” thins out and historians apply the imprecise label of soslovie
and sketch long-term developments. Only at the micro level can we observe the social
relations and “going concerns” that constituted a community. And as the critic Siegfried
Kracauer long ago pointed out, observations at this level are unlikely to be commensurate
with what is visible at the macro level. To begin with, one can capture the character of
relations at the micro level only if one examines it without preconceptions derived from
the larger picture.  For the most part,  historians who have drawn on the minutiae of
historical  episodes  have done so  merely  to  select  micro  events  that  will  confirm an
already formulated generalization. This misses the point of such an investigation.34 We
should investigate the social dynamics that function in a locality for their own sake and
only  then judge  the  degree  of  their  fit  with  what  is  seen  at  the  macro  level.  Good
examples can be found in the work of Italian historians. To take a well-known example, a
study  by  Giovanni  Levi  discovered that  what  historians  working  on the  macro  level
thought to be a modern “depersonalized” market in land turned out on closer inspection
to be a land exchange in which prices were set by kinship bonds.35 Even better known is
the celebrated study by Carlo Ginzburg of the miller Mennochio, whose testimony opened
our eyes to a religious world tenaciously resistant to the domination of  the Catholic
Church.36
26 More of this type of close study is needed if we are to get beyond the soslovie paradigm
and understand the going concerns and social  bonds that allowed Russia to function
effectively and grow into the powerful modern nation that emerged in the twentieth
century. We have seen a few studies. One of the first was Steven L. Hoch’s examination of
a serf village in Tambov province. It shed new light on peasant diet and undermined the
established view of  the  immiseration of  the  Russian peasantry  under  serfdom.  More
importantly, Hoch revealed the social dynamic that maintained control in the village, an
alliance between bailiffs and serf heads of household or, in other words, a system that
united people of different sosloviia to their mutual advantage.37
27 Again, my own close study of a provincial merchant and his society shows the kind of
interactions and cooperation across a variety of soslovie lines that characterized business,
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government, and charitable projects all across Russia. A good example is the restoration
of  a  cathedral  in  the  merchant’s  town.  The  project  involved  the  cooperation  and
coordinated  response  of  the  bishop  and  local  clergy,  leading  members  of  the  local
nobility,  the town’s entire merchant community,  Moscow architects,  contractors,  and
other professionals,  and state officials.  Much of  the coordination and mobilization of
charitable  contributions  was  done  by  the  mayor,  but  the  bishop and leading  nobles
likewise played important roles. These people met regularly in one another’s homes and
at  the  cathedral  rectory,  and  their  efforts  accomplished  a  major  overhaul  of  the
crumbling sixteenth-century cathedral in less than three years while the country was at
war on two fronts and the central government unable to provide funding. This was an
exceptional project, but the social dynamics that made it possible were not. Even during
quieter times, state officials, leading merchants, nobles, and clergy in the town dined at
one  another’s  homes  and cooperated  on business  and other  projects.38 A  number  of
Russian  scholars  are  beginning  in  studies  of  everyday  life  to  encounter  similar
interactions.  For  example,  the  current  research of  Alexander  Kamenskii  on financial
transactions in the town of Bezhetsk have turned up interesting cases of close contacts
and common actions by people of different social positions. Kamenskii reports that while
documents in the town magistracy mostly concern townsmen, they also “demonstrate
their  communication  and  business  relations  with  all  other  social  groups  –  peasants,
nobles, clergy, military, merchants from other towns, clerks, etc. This very fact shows
that the borders between different classes in eighteenth-century Russia were not as strict
as they are considered to be.”39
28 Soslovie designations were nevertheless of great importance as markers of dignity and
financial, military, and other obligations. To continue the focus on commercial families,
they strove to enter the ranks of the merchant estate in order to escape the degraded
status of  poll-tax payers and the accompanying obligations of  conscription and work
services.  Once in the merchant  ranks,  Russians anxiously sought  to remain there by
whatever means they could, including pooling the resources of several family members to
reach the qualifying capital requirement each year. The greatest source of anxiety for
these people was the risk of  falling back into the poll-tax population,  and whenever
possible they sought to elevate the position of merchants to an ascriptive status like that
enjoyed by the nobles and clergy.40 Indeed, as merchants increasingly recognized their
importance to  the state,  they sought  to  nudge their  sumptuary privileges  and other
outward expressions of dignity toward those of the nobility, even while in some respects,
especially after the Napoleonic invasion, they wished to portray themselves as different,
more genuinely Russian and patriotic, than the nobility.41
29 If soslovie markers created opportunities and anxieties, soslovie institutions could serve as
protective mechanisms for in-groups.  As Elise Wirtschafter mentions,  Imperial  Russia
either suffered or benefited (depending on one’s point of view and circumstances) from
administrative fragmentation and lack of translocal authority and representation. Every
local administrative organ was in some sense an agent of the central state, whether or not
it was locally elected. When a state agent in the person of the voevoda or police chief (
ispravnik) demanded something of a local magistracy, the magistrates had to comply. But
when no  state-ordered  commands  were  involved,  these  bodies  were  free  to  manage
affairs and decide cases in their own way so long as they followed the normal procedures
and protocols. The merchant of my study, for example, had fallen into debts so large that
he had no hope of paying them off. Before declaring bankruptcy and asking permission to
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continue at liberty so that he could earn the money needed to satisfy his creditors, he
transferred most of his assets to family members through third parties and concocted a
variety  of  other  schemes  to  avoid  destitution  and  spare  his  family  the  shame  of
descending into the poll-tax population. Despite vigorous and persistent protests from
several creditors,  nobles for the most part,  the magistracy interpreted laws and even
sought out remote and scarcely relevant precedents that they claimed allowed them to
ignore the transfer of assets and permit the merchant to remain at liberty. The merchant
had been a colleague and friend, serving for many years as a magistrate and then mayor,
had contributed generously to local religious and charitable efforts, and had arranged his
affairs in such a way that no local merchants, apart from his near relatives, had been
injured by his misdeeds. Efforts by his creditors to appeal outside the jurisdiction of the
local magistrates proved of no avail. The decision was theirs alone, so long as a state
interest was not involved.42
30 But this story of the use of a soslovie institution for protection of one of its members,
while  certainly an instance of  personal  and even soslovie solidarity,  is  not  as  clear  a
marker of division as one might expect. Some of the merchant’s allies in the case were
nobles, and his personal contacts and business associations continued in the future to
include members of the nobility as well as members of most other social groups. The
personal,  commercial,  and recreational  dimensions  of  life  included enduring  vertical
relationships that are obscured by a view of Russian society primarily through a soslovie
lens.
31 This remained the era of sporadic government intrusion at the local level and rule by
clienteles. We are still looking at a patrimonial regime ruling a society based on loosely
organized institutions, not functionally defined and action-oriented corporate bodies. A
short time later we would see a new approach. In 1800, the government enacted a modern
bankruptcy law aimed at detailed and functionally differentiated regulation of relations
between debtors and creditors.43 The modern corporate state was beginning to emerge.
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The  essay  commends  Michael  Confino’s  challenging  criticisms  over  many  years  of  the
conceptualizations  commonly  used  by  historians  of  Russia.  David  L.  Ransel  agrees  with  the
criticisms of the soslovie paradigm advanced by Confino in his recent essay. Ransel suggests that
by adapting the soslovie to class conceptualization of Russia’s modernization, historians may have
missed  seeing  a  more  fruitful  and instructive  conceptualization,  one  usually  associated  with
Ibero-Latin regimes rather than Russia, namely, the development of Russia from a patrimonial
state to a  corporate state and society.  Ransel  also points  out  the obstacles  presented by the
soslovie paradigm  for  understanding  of  the  micro-dynamics  of  Russian  history.  The  soslovie
paradigm tends to blind scholars to a feature of Russian life that Confino himself had commented
on many years ago: Russians of all social statuses lived in close proximity and interacted daily.
Ransel gives examples from his own work and the work of others and calls for more study of the
micro-dynamics of Russian history.
Résumé
Le  présent  essai  appuie  les  critiques  stimulantes  formulées  par  Michael  Confino  pendant  de
nombreuses années sur les conceptualisations communément utilisées par les historiens de la
Russie. L’auteur admet les critiques de la notion de soslovie avancées par Confino dans son dernier
article  (CMR,  49  (4),  2008).  Il  laisse  entendre  qu’en  adoptant  le  modèle  selon  lequel  la
modernisation de la Russie se serait opérée par le passage d’une société de soslovija à une société
de classes, les historiens ont pu passer à côté d’une autre conceptualisation plus fructueuse et
édifiante, associée d’ordinaire aux régimes latino-américains et ibériens plutôt qu’à la Russie, à
savoir, le développement de la Russie par le passage d’un État patrimonial à un État et une société
corporatistes. L’auteur pointe également les obstacles que soulève la notion de soslovie dans la
compréhension de la microdynamique de l’histoire russe. La notion de soslovie tend à masquer un
aspect de la vie russe que Confino lui-même avait commenté il y a longtemps déjà : les Russes de
tous  statuts  sociaux  vivaient  en  proximité  étroite  et  étaient  en  contact  quotidiennement.
L’auteur propose des exemples extraits de différents travaux, dont les siens, et invite à utiliser
davantage l’approche microdynamique de l’histoire russe.
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